We show that fine-grained and coarse-grained dynamic information-flow control (IFC) systems are equally expressive. To this end, we mechanize two mostly standard languages, one with a fine-grained dynamic IFC system and the other with a coarse-grained dynamic IFC system, and prove a semantics-preserving translation from each language to the other. In addition, we derive the standard security property of non-interference of each language from that of the other, via our verified translation. This result addresses a longstanding open problem in IFC: whether coarse-grained dynamic IFC techniques are less expressive than fine-grained dynamic IFC techniques (they are not!). The translations also stand to have important implications on the usability of IFC approaches. The coarse-to fine-grained direction can be used to remove the label annotation burden that fine-grained systems impose on developers, while the fine-to coarse-grained translation shows that coarse-grained systemsÐwhich are easier to design and implementÐcan track information as precisely as fine-grained systems and provides an algorithm for automatically retrofitting legacy applications to run on existing coarse-grained systems.
INTRODUCTION
Dynamic information-flow control (IFC) is a principled approach to protecting the confidentiality and integrity of data in software systems. Conceptually, dynamic IFC systems are very simpleÐthey associate security levels or labels with every bit of data in the system to subsequently track and restrict the flow of labeled data throughout the system, e.g., to enforce a security property such as non-interference [Goguen and Meseguer 1982] . In practice, dynamic IFC implementations are considerably more complexÐthe granularity of the tracking system alone has important implications for the usage of IFC technology. Indeed, until somewhat recently , granularity was the main distinguishing factor between dynamic IFC operating systems and From Fine-to Coarse-Grained Dynamic Information Flow Control and Back
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M [ ] | r : M coarse-grained language. While this primitive is largely necessary for us to establish the coarse-to fine-grained translation, extending existing fine-grained systems with it is both secure and trivial. The implications of our results are multi-fold. The fine-to coarse-grained translation formally confirms an old OS-community hypothesis that it is possible to restructure a system into smaller compartments to address the label creep problemÐindeed our translation is a (naive) algorithm for doing so. This translation also allows running legacy fine-grained IFC compatible applications atop coarse-grained systems like LIO. Dually, the coarse-to fine-grained translation allows developers building new applications in a fine-grained system to avoid the annotation burden of the fine-grained system by writing some of the code in the coarse-grained system and compiling it automatically to the fine-grained system with our translation. The technical contributions of this paper are:
• A pair of semantics-preserving translations between traditional dynamic fine-grained and coarse-grained IFC systems equipped with label introspection (Theorems 3 and 5).
• Two different proofs of termination-insensitive non-interference (TINI) for each calculus: one is derived directly in the usual way (Theorems 1 and 2), while the other is recovered via our verified translation (Theorems 4 and 6).
• Mechanized Agda proofs of our results (~4,000 LOC) 1 . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our dynamic fine-and coarse-grained IFC calculi are introduced in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. We also prove their soundness guarantees (i.e., termination-insensitive non-interference). Section 4 presents the translation from the fine-to the coarse-grained calculus and recovers the non-interference of the former from the non-interference theorem of the latter. Section 5 has similar results in the other direction. Related work is described in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes the paper.
FINE-GRAINED CALCULUS
In order to compare in a rigorous way fine-and coarse-grained dynamic IFC techniques, we formally define the operational semantics of two λ-calculi that respectively perform fine-and coarse-grained IFC dynamically. Figure 1 shows the syntax of the dynamic fine-grained IFC calculus λ d FG , which is inspired by Austin and Flanagan [2009] and extended with a standard (security unaware) type system Γ ⊢ e :τ (omitted), sum and product data types and security labels ℓ ∈ L that form a lattice (L , ⊑). 2 In order to capture flows of information precisely at run-time, the λ d FG -calculus features intrinsically labeled values, written r ℓ , meaning that raw value r has security level ℓ. Compound values, e.g., pairs and sums, carry labels to tag the security level of each component, for example a pair containing a secret and a public boolean would be written (true H , false L ). 3 Functional values are closures (x.e, θ ), where x is the variable that binds the argument in the body of the function e and all other free variables are mapped to some labeled value in the environment θ . The λ d FGcalculus features a labeled partitioned stored, i.e., Σ ∈ (ℓ : L ) → Memory ℓ, where Memory ℓ is the memory that contains values at security level ℓ. Each reference carries an additional label annotation that records the label of the memory it refers toÐreference n ℓ points to the n-th cell of the ℓ-labeled memory, i.e., Σ(ℓ). Notice that this label has nothing to do with the intrinsic label that decorates the reference itself. For example, a reference (n H ) L represents a secret reference in a public context, whereas (n L )
H represents a public reference in a secret context. Notice that there is no order invariant between those labelsÐin the latter case, the IFC runtime monitor prevents writing data to the reference to avoid implicit flows. A program can create, read and write a labeled reference via constructs new(e), !e and e 1 := e 2 and inspect its subscripted label with the primitive labelOfRef(·).
Dynamics
The operational semantics of λ d FG includes a security monitor that propagates the label annotations of input values during program execution and assigns security labels to the result accordingly. The monitor prevents information leakage by stopping the execution of potentially leaky programs, which is reflected in the semantics by not providing reduction rules for the cases that may cause insecure information flow. 4 The relation ⟨Σ, e⟩ ⇓ θ pc ⟨Σ ′ , v⟩ denotes the evaluation of program e with initial store Σ that terminates with labeled value v and final store Σ ′ . The environment θ stores the input values of the program and is extended with intermediate results during function application and case analysis. The subscript pc is the program counter label [Sabelfeld and Myers 2006] Ð it is a label that represents the security level of the context in which the expression is evaluated. The semantics employs the program counter label to (i) propagate and assign labels to values computed by a program and (ii) prevent implicit flow leaks that exploit the control flow and the store (explained below).
In particular, when a program produces a value, the monitor tags the raw value with the program counter label in order to record the security level of the context in which it was computed. For this reason all the introduction rules for ground and compound types ([Unit,Label,Fun,Inl,Inr,Pair] ) assign security level pc to the result. Other than that, these rules are fairly standardÐwe simply note that rule [Fun] creates a closure by capturing the current environment θ .
When the control flow of a program depends on some intermediate value, the program counter label is joined with the value's label so that the label of the final result will be tainted with the result of the intermediate value. For instance, consider case analysis, i.e., case e x.e 1 x.e 2 . Rules [Case 1 ] and [Case 2 ] evaluate the scrutinee e to a value (either inl(v) ℓ or inr(v) ℓ ), add the value to the environment, i.e., θ [x → v], and then execute the appropriate branch with a program counter label tainted with v's security label, i.e., pc ⊔ ℓ. As a result, the monitor tracks data dependencies across control flow constructs through the label of the result. Function application follows the same principle. In rule [App] , since the first premise evaluates the function to some closure (x.e, θ ′ ) at security level ℓ, the third premise evaluates the body with program counter label raised to pc ⊔ ℓ. The evaluation strategy is call-by-value: it evaluates the argument before the body in the second premise and binds the corresponding variable to its value in the environment of the closure, i.e., θ ′ [x → v 2 ]. Notice that the security level of the argument is irrelevant at this stage and that this is beneficial to not over-tainting the result: if the function never uses its argument then the label of the result depends exclusively on the program counter label, e.g., (λx.
The elimination rules for variables and pairs taint the label of the corresponding value with the program counter label for security reasons. In rules [Var,Fst,Snd] the notation, v ⊔ ℓ ′ upgrades the label of v with ℓ ′ Ðit is a shorthand for r ℓ ⊔ ℓ ′ with v = r ℓ . Intuitively, public values must be considered secret when the program counter is secret, for example
and updates the memory store accordingly. 5 Since the security level of the reference is as sensitive as the content, which is at least as sensitive as the program counter label by Property 1 (pc ⊑ ℓ) this operation does not leak information via implicit flows. When reading the content of reference n ℓ at security level ℓ ′ , rule [Read] retrieves the corresponding raw value from the n-th cell of the ℓ-labeled memory, i.e., Σ ′ (ℓ)[n] = r and upgrades its label to ℓ ⊔ ℓ ′ since the decision to read from that particular reference depends on information at security level ℓ ′ . When writing to a reference the monitor performs security checks to avoid leaks via explicit or implicit flows. Rule [Write] achieves this by evaluating the reference, i.e., (n ℓ ) ℓ 1 and replacing its content with the value of the second argument, i.e., r ℓ 2 , under the conditions that the decision of łwhichž reference to update does not depend on data more sensitive than the reference itself, i.e., ℓ 1 ⊑ ℓ (not checking this would leak via an implicit flow) 6 , and that the new content is no more sensitive than the reference itself, i.e., ℓ 2 ⊑ ℓ (not checking this would leak sensitive information to a less sensitive reference via an explicit flow). Lastly, rule [LabelOfRef] retrieves the label of the reference and protects it with the label itself (as explained before) and taints it with the security level of the reference, i.e., ℓ ℓ ⊔ ℓ ′ to avoid leaks. Intuitively, the label of the reference, i.e., ℓ, depends also on data at security level ℓ ′ as seen in the premise.
Other Extensions. We consider λ d FG equipped with references as sufficient foundation to study the relationship between fine-grained and coarse-grained IFC. We remark that extending it with other side-effects such as file operations, or other IO-operations would not change our claims in Section 4 and 5. The main reason for this is that, typically, handling such effects would be done at the same granularity in both IFC enforcements. For instance, when adding file operations, both fine-(e.g., [Broberg et al. 2013] ) and coarse-grained (e.g., [Efstathopoulos et al. 2005; Russo et al. 2009; ) enforcements are likely to assign a single flow-insensitive label to each file in order to denote the sensitivity of its content. Then, those features could be handled flow-insensitively in both systems (e.g., Pottier and Simonet 2003; Vassena and Russo 2016] ), in a manner similar to what we have just shown for references in 
Security
We now prove that λ d FG is secure, i.e., it satisfies termination insensitive non-interference (TINI) [Goguen and Meseguer 1982; Volpano and Smith 1997] ([Inl,Inr] ). In particular, closures are related if they contain the same function (up to α-renaming) 7 and L-equivalent environments, i.e., the environments are
We define L-equivalence for stores pointwise, i.e., 
We now formally state and prove that λ d FG semantics preserves L-equivalence of configurations under L-equivalent environments, i.e., termination-insensitive non-interference (TINI).
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Type: Proof. By induction on the derivations. Dynamic language-based fine-grained IFC, of which λ d FG is just a particular instance, represents an intuitive approach to tracking information flows in programs. Programmers annotate input values with labels that represent their sensitivity and a label-aware instrumented security monitor propagates those labels during execution and computes the result of the program together with a conservative approximation of its sensitivity. The next section describes an IFC monitor that tracks information flows at coarse granularity.
COARSE-GRAINED CALCULUS
One of the drawbacks of dynamic fine-grained IFC is that the programming model requires all input values to be explicitly and fully annotated with their security labels. Imagine a program with many inputs and highly structured data: it quickly becomes cumbersome, if not impossible, for the programmer to specify all the labels. The label of some inputs may be sensitive (e.g., passwords, pin codes, etc.), but the sensitivity of the rest may probably be irrelevant for the computation, yet a programmer must come up with appropriate labels for them as well. The programmer is then torn between two opposing risks: over-approximating the actual sensitivity can negatively affect execution (the monitor might stop secure programs), under-approximating the sensitivity can endanger security. Even worse, specifying many labels manually is error-prone and assigning the wrong security label to a piece of sensitive data can be catastrophic for security and completely defeat the purpose of IFC. Dynamic coarse-grained IFC represents an attractive alternative that requires fewer annotations, in particular it allows the programmer to label only the inputs that need to be protected. Figure 6 shows the syntax of λ dCG , a standard simply-typed λ-calculus extended with security primitives for dynamic coarse-grained IFC, inspired by and adapted to use call-by-value instead of call-by-name to match λ d FG . The λ dCG -calculus features both standard (unlabeled) values and explicitly labeled values. For example, Labeled H true represents a secret boolean value of type Labeled bool. 8 The type constructor LIO encapsulates a security state monad, whose state consists of a labeled store and the program counter label. In addition to standard return(·) and bind(·) constructs, the monad provides primitives that regulate the creation and the inspection of labeled values, i.e., toLabeled(·), unlabel(·) and labelOf(·), and the interaction with the labeled store, allowing the creation, reading and writing of labeled references n ℓ through the constructs new(e), !e, e 1 := e 2 , respectively. The primitives of the LIO monad are listed in a separate sub-category of expressions called thunk. Intuitively, a thunk is just a description of a stateful computation, which only the top-level security monitor can executeÐa thunk closure, i.e., (t, θ ), provides a way to suspend computations.
Dynamics
In order to track information flows dynamically at coarse granularity, λ dCG employs a technique called floating-label, which was originally developed for IFC operating systems (e.g., [Zeldovich et al. 2006 [Zeldovich et al. , 2008 ) and that was later applied in a language-based setting. In this technique, throughout a program's execution, the program counter floats above the label of any value observed during program execution and thus represents (an upper-bound on) the sensitivity of all the values that are not explicitly labeled. For this reason, λ dCG stores the program counter label in the program configuration, so that the primitives of the LIO monad can control it explicitly (in technical terms the program counter is flow-sensitive, i.e., it may assume different values in the final configuration depending on the control flow of the program). 9 Like λ d FG , the operational semantics of λ dCG consists of a security monitor that fully evaluates secure programs but prevents the execution of insecure programs and similarly enforces terminationinsensitive non-interference (Theorem 2). Figure 7 shows the big-step operational semantics of λ dCG in two parts: (i) a top-level security monitor for monadic programs and (ii) a straightforward call-by-value side-effect-free semantics for pure expressions. The semantics of the security monitor is further split into two mutually recursive reduction relations, one for arbitrary expressions ( Fig. 7a ) and one specific to thunks (Fig. 7c) . These constitute the forcing semantics of the monad, which reduce a thunk to a pure value and perform side-effects. In particular, given the initial store Σ, program counter label pc, expression e of type LIO τ for some type τ and input values θ (which may or may not be labeled), the monitor executes the program, i.e., ⟨Σ, pc, e⟩ ⇓ θ ⟨Σ ′ , pc ′ , v⟩ and gives an updated store Σ ′ , updated program counter pc ′ and a final value v of type τ , which also might not be labeled. The execution starts with rule [Force] , which reduces the pure expression to a thunk closure, i.e., (t, θ ′ ) and then forces the thunk t in its environment θ ′ with the thunk semantics. The pure semantics is fairly standardÐwe report some selected rules in Fig. 7b for comparison with λ d FG . A pure reduction, written e ⇓ θ v, evaluates an expression e with an appropriate environment θ to a pure value v. Notice that, unlike λ d FG , all reduction rules of the pure semantics ignore security, even those that affect the control flow of the program, e.g., rule [App]: they do not feature the program counter label or label annotations. They are also pureÐthey do not have access to the store, thus only the security monitor needs to protect against implicit flows.
If the pure evaluation reaches a side-effectful computation, i.e., thunk t, it suspends the computation by creating a thunk closure that captures the current environment θ (see rule [Thunk] state. Rule [Unlabel] is interesting. Following the floating-label principle, it returns the value wrapped inside the labeled value, i.e., v, and raises the program counter with its label, i.e., pc ⊔ ℓ, to reflect the fact that new data at security level ℓ is now in scope. Floating-label based coarse-grained IFC systems like LIO suffer from the label creep problem, which occurs when the program counter gets over-tainted, e.g., because too many secrets have unlabeled, to the point that no useful further computation can be performed. Primitive toLabeled(·) provides a mechanism to address this problem by (i) creating a separate context where some sensitive computation can take place and (ii) restoring the original program counter label afterwards. Rule [ToLabeled] formalizes this idea. Notice that the result of the nested sensitive computation, i.e., v, cannot be simply returned to the lower contextÐthat would be a leak, so toLabeled(·) wraps that piece of information in a labeled value protected by the final program counter of the sensitive computation, i.e., Labeled pc ′ v. 11 Furthermore, notice that pc ′ , the label that tags the result v, is as sensitive as the result itself because the final program counter depends on all the unlabel(·) operations performed to compute the result. This motivates why primitive labelOf(·) does not simply project the label from a labeled value, but additionally taints the program counter with the label itself in rule [LabelOf]śa label in a labeled value has sensitivity equal to the label itself, thus the program counter label rises to accommodate reading new sensitive data. Lastly, rule [GetLabel] returns the value of the program counter, which does not rise (because pc ⊔ pc = pc), and rule [Taint] simply taints the program counter with the given label and returns unit (this primitive matches the functionality of taint(·) in λ d FG ). Note that, in λ dCG , taint(·) takes only the label with which the program counter must be tainted whereas, in λ d FG , it additionally requires the expression that must be evaluated in the tainted environment. This difference highlights the flow-sensitive nature of the program counter label in λ dCG .
References. λ dCG features flow-insensitive labeled references similar to λ d FG and allows programs to create, read, update and inspect the label inside the LIO monad (see Figure 8 ). The API of these primitives takes explicitly labeled values as arguments, by making explicit at the type level, the tagging that occurs in memory, which was left implicit in previous work . Rule [New] creates a reference labeled with the same label annotation as that of the labeled value it receives as an argument, and checks that pc ⊑ ℓ in order to avoid implicit flows. Rule [Read] retrieves the content of the reference from the ℓ-labeled memory and returns it. Since this brings data at security level ℓ in scope, the program counter is tainted accordingly, i.e., pc ⊔ ℓ. Rule [Write] performs security checks analogous to those in λ d FG and updates the content of a given reference and rule [LabelOfRef] returns the label on a reference and taints the context accordingly.
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Property 2.
•
Proof. By mutual induction on the given evaluation derivations.
Security
We now prove that λ dCG is secure, i.e., it satisfies termination-insensitive non-interference. The meaning of the security condition is intuitively similar to that presented in Section 2.2 for λ d FG Ð when secret inputs are changed, terminating programs do not produce any publicly observable effectÐand based on a similar indistinguishability relation. Figure 9 presents 
Closures and thunks are related if the function and the monadic computations are α-equivalent and their environments are related, i.e., θ 1 ≈ L θ 2 iff Dom(θ 1 ) ≡ Dom(θ 2 ) and ∀x.θ 1 (x) ≈ L θ 2 (x). Labeled references, memories and stores are related by L-equivalence analogously to λ d FG . Lastly, L-equivalence relates initial configurations with related stores, equal program counters and α-equivalent expressions (resp. thunks), i.e., c 1 ≈ L c 2 iff c 1 = ⟨Σ 1 , pc 1 , e 1 ⟩, c 2 = ⟨Σ 2 , pc 2 , e 2 ⟩, Σ 1 ≈ L Σ 2 , pc 1 ≡ pc 2 , and e 1 ≡ α e 2 (resp. t 1 ≡ α t 2 for thunks t 1 and t 2 ), and final configurations with related stores and (i) equal public program counter, i.e., pc ⊑ L, and related values [Pc L ], or (ii) arbitrary secret public counters, i.e., pc 1 ̸ ⊑ L and pc 2 ̸ ⊑ L, and arbitrary values [Pc H ].
We now formally state and prove that λ dCG semantics preserve L-equivalence under L-equivalent environments, i.e., termination-insensitive non-interference (TINI). Proof. By induction on the derivations. At this point, we have formalized two calculiÐλ d FG and λ dCG Ðthat perform dynamic IFC at fine and coarse granularity, respectively. While they have some similarities, i.e., they are both functional languages that feature labeled annotated data, references and label introspection primitives, and ensure a termination-insensitive security condition, they also have striking differences. First and foremost, they differ in the number of label annotationsÐpervasive in λ d FG and optional in λ dCG Ð with significant implications for the programming model and usability. Second, they differ in the nature of the program counter, flow-insensitive in λ d FG and flow-sensitive in λ dCG . Third, they differ in the way they deal with side-effectsÐλ dCG allows side-effectful computations exclusively inside the monad, while λ d FG is impure, i.e., any λ d FG expression can modify the state. This difference affects the effort required to implement a system that performs language-based fine-and coarsegrained dynamic IFC. In fact, several coarse-grained IFC languages [Buiras et al. 2015; Jaskelioff and Russo 2011; Russo 2015; Russo et al. 2009; Schmitz et al. 2018; Tsai et al. 2007 ] have been implemented as an embedded domain specific language (EDSL) in a Haskell library with little effort, exploiting the strict control that the host language provides on side-effects. Adapting an existing language to perform fine-grained IFC requires major engineering effort, because several components (all the way from the parser to the runtime system) must be adapted to be label-aware.
In the next two sections we show thatÐdespite their differencesÐthese two calculi are, in fact, equally expressive.
FINE-TO COARSE-GRAINED PROGRAM TRANSLATION
This section presents a provably semantics-preserving program translation from the fine-grained dynamic IFC calculus λ d FG to the coarse-grained calculus λ dCG . At a high level, the translation performs two tasks (i) it embeds the intrinsic label annotation of λ d FG values into an explicitly labeled λ dCG value via the Labeled type constructor and (ii) it restructures λ d FG side-effectful expressions into monadic operations inside the LIO monad. Our type-driven approach starts by formalizing this intuition in the function ⟨⟨ · ⟩⟩, which maps the λ d FG type τ to the corresponding λ dCG type ⟨⟨τ ⟩⟩ (see Figure 10a) . The function is defined by induction on types and recursively adds the Labeled type constructor to each existing λ d FG type constructor. For the function type τ 1 → τ 2 , the result is additionally monadic, i.e., ⟨⟨τ 1 ⟩⟩ → LIO⟨⟨τ 2 ⟩⟩. This is because the function's body in ⟨⟨inl(e)⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do le ← ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ return(inl(lv)))
⟨⟨inr(e)⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do le ← ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ return(inr(lv)))
⟨⟨(e 1 , e 2 )⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do
⟨⟨case(e, x.e 1 , x.e 2 )⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do
⟨⟨taint(e 1 , e 2 )⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do
⟨⟨labelOf(e)⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do lv ← ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ labelOf(lv)) ⟨⟨getLabel⟩⟩ = toLabeled(getLabel) closure by translating the body of the function to a thunk, i.e., ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ (see below), and translating the environment pointwise, i.e., ⟨⟨θ ⟩⟩ = λx.⟨⟨θ (x)⟩⟩.
Expressions. We show the translation of λ d FG expressions to λ dCG monadic thunks in Figure 11 . We use the standard do notation for readability. 12 First, notice that the translation of all constructs occurs inside a toLabeled(·) block. This achieves two goals, (i) it ensures that the value that results from a translated expression is explicitly labeled and (ii) it creates an isolated nested context where the translated thunk can execute without raising the program counter label at the top level. Inside the toLabeled(·) block, the program counter label may rise, e.g., when some intermediate result is unlabeled, and the translation relies on LIO's floating-label mechanism to track dependencies between data of different security levels. In particular, we will show later that the value of the program counter label at the end of each nested block coincides with the label annotation of the λ d FG value that the original expression evaluates to. For example, introduction forms of ground values (unit, labels, and functions) are simply returned inside the toLabeled(·) block so that they get tagged with the current value of the program counter label just as in the corresponding λ d FG introduction rules ([Label,Unit,Fun] 
when started with program counter label L. The translation of variables gives some insight into how the λ dCG floating-label mechanism can simulate λ d FG 's tainting approach. First, the type-driven approach set out in Figure 10a demands that functions take only labeled values as arguments, so the variables in the source program are always associated to a labeled value in the translated program. The values that correspond to these variables are stored in the environment θ and translated separately, e.g., if θ (x) = r ℓ in λ d FG , then x gets bound to ⟨⟨r ℓ ⟩⟩ = Labeled ℓ⟨⟨r ⟩⟩ when translated to λ dCG . Thus, the translation converts a variable, say x, to toLabeled(unlabel(x)), so that its label gets tainted with the current program counter label. More precisely, unlabel(x) retrieves the labeled value associated with the variable, i.e., Labeled ℓ⟨⟨r ⟩⟩, taints the program counter with its label to make it pc ⊔ ℓ, and returns the content, i.e., ⟨⟨r ⟩⟩. Since unlabel(x) occurs inside a toLabeled(·) block, the code above results in Labeled (pc ⊔ ℓ)⟨⟨r ⟩⟩ when evaluated, matching precisely the tainting behavior of
The elimination forms for other types (function application, pair projections and case analysis) follow the same approach. For example, the code that translates a function application e 1 e 2 first executes the code that computes the translated function, i.e., lv 1 ← ⟨⟨e 1 ⟩⟩, then the code that computes the argument, i.e., lv 2 ← ⟨⟨e 2 ⟩⟩ and then retrieves the function from the first labeled value, i.e., v 1 ← unlabel(lv 1 ). 14 The function v 1 applied to the labeled argument lv 2 gives a computation that gets executed and returns a labeled value lv that gets unlabeled to expose the final result (the surrounding toLabeled(·) wraps it again right away). The translation of case analysis is analogous. The translation of pair projections first converts the λ d FG pair into a computation that gives a λ dCG labeled pair of labeled values, say Labeled ℓ (Labeled ℓ 1 ⟨⟨r 1 ⟩⟩, Labeled ℓ 2 ⟨⟨r 2 ⟩⟩) and removes the label tag on the pair via unlabel, thus raising the program counter label to pc ⊔ ℓ. Then, it projects the appropriate component and unlabels it, thus tainting the program counter label even further with the label of either the first or the second component. This coincides with the tainting mechanism of λ d FG for projection rules, e.g., in rule [Fst] where fst(e) ⇓ θ pc r 1
Lastly, translating taint(e 1 , e 2 ) requires (i) translating the expression e 1 that gives the label, (ii) using taint(·) from λ dCG to explicitly taint the program counter label with the label that e 1 gives, and (iii) translating the second argument e 2 to execute in the tainted context and unlabeling the result. The construct labelOf(e) of λ d FG uses the corresponding λ dCG primitive applied on the corresponding labeled value, say Labeled ℓ⟨⟨r ⟩⟩, obtained from the translated expression. Notice
⟨⟨labelOfRef(e)⟩⟩ = toLabeled( do lr ← ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ r ← unlabel(lv) labelOfRef(r )) that labelOf(·) taints the program counter label in λ dCG , which rises to pc ⊔ ℓ, so the code just described results in Labeled (pc ⊔ ℓ) ℓ, which corresponds to the translation of the result in λ d FG , i.e., ⟨⟨ℓ ℓ ⟩⟩ = Labeled ℓ ℓ because pc ⊔ ℓ ≡ ℓ, since pc ⊑ ℓ from Property 1. The translation of getLabel follows naturally by simply wrapping λ dCG 's getLabel inside a toLabeled(·), which correctly returns the program counter label labeled with itself, i.e., Labeled pc pc. [Bind] , and mix with the input values of the source program and output values as well, thus complicating the correctness statement of the translation, which now has to account for those extra variables as well. In order to avoid this nuisance, we employ a special form of weakening that allows shrinking the environment at run-time and removing spurious values that are not needed in the rest of the program. In particular, expression wken x e has the same type as e if variables x are not free in e, see the formal typing rule [WkenType] in Figure 12 . At run-time, the expression wken x e evaluates e in an environment from which variables x have been dropped, so that they do not get captured in any closure created during the execution of e. Rule [Wken] is part of the pure semantics of λ dCG Ðthe semantics of λ d FG includes an analogous rule (the issue of contaminated environments arises in the translations in both directions, thus both calculi feature wken). We remark that this expedient is not essentialÐwe can avoid it by slightly complicating the correctness statement to explicitly account for those extra variables. Nor is this expedient particularly interesting. In fact, we omit wken from the code of the program translations to avoid clutter (our mechanization includes wken in the appropriate places).
References. Figure 13 shows the program translation of λ d FG primitives that access the store via references. The translation of λ d FG values wraps references in λ dCG labeled values (Figure 10b ), so the translations of Figure 13 take care of boxing and unboxing references. The translation of new(e) has a top-level toLabeled(·) block that simply translates the content (lv ← ⟨⟨e⟩⟩) and puts it in a new reference (new(lv)). The λ dCG rule [New] (Figure 8 ) assigns the label of the translated content to the new reference, which also gets labeled with the original program counter label 15 , just as in the λ d FG rule [New] (Figure 4) . In λ d FG , rule [Read] reads from a reference n ℓ ℓ ′ at security level ℓ ′ that points to the ℓ-labeled memory, and returns the content Σ(ℓ) [n] ℓ ⊔ ℓ ′ at level ℓ ⊔ ℓ ′ . Similarly, the translation creates a toLabeled(·) block that executes to get a labeled reference lr = Labeled ℓ ′ n ℓ , extracts the reference n ℓ (r ← unlabel(lr)) tainting the program counter label with ℓ ′ , and then reads the reference's content further tainting the program counter label with ℓ as well. The code that translates and updates a reference consists of two toLabeled(·) blocks. The first block is responsible for the update: it extracts the labeled reference and the labeled new content (lr and lv resp.), extracts the reference from the labeled value (r ← unlabel(lr)) and updates it (r := lv). The second block, toLabeled(return()), returns unit at security level pc, i.e., Labeled pc (), similar to the λ d FG rule [Write] . The translation of labelOfRef(e) extracts the reference and projects its label via the λ dCG primitive labelOfRef(·), which additionally taints the program counter with the label itself, similar to the λ d FG rule [LabelOfRef] .
Correctness
In this section, we establish some desirable properties of the λ d FG -to-λ dCG translation defined above. These properties include type and semantics preservation as well as recovery of non-interferenceÐa meta criterion that rules out a class of semantically correct (semantics preserving), yet elusive translations that do not preserve the meaning of security labels [Barthe et al. 2007; Rajani and Garg 2018] .
We start by showing that the program translation preserves typing. The type translation for typing contexts Γ is pointwise, i.e., ⟨⟨Γ⟩⟩ = λx.⟨⟨Γ(x)⟩⟩.
Lemma 4.1 (Type Preservation). Given a well-typed λ d FG expression, i.e., Γ ⊢ e : τ , the translated λ dCG expression is also well-typed, i.e., ⟨⟨Γ⟩⟩ ⊢ ⟨⟨e⟩⟩ : LIO⟨⟨τ ⟩⟩.
Proof. By induction on the given typing derivation. □
The main correctness criterion for the translation is semantics preservation. Intuitively, proving this theorem ensures that the program translation preserves the meaning of secure λ d FG programs when translated and executed with λ dCG semantics (under a translated environment). In the theorem below 16 , the translation of stores and memories is pointwise, i.e., ⟨⟨Σ⟩⟩ = λℓ.⟨⟨Σ(ℓ)⟩⟩, and ⟨⟨[ ]⟩⟩ = [ ] and ⟨⟨r : M⟩⟩ = ⟨⟨r ⟩⟩ : ⟨⟨M⟩⟩ for each ℓ-labeled memory M. Furthermore, notice that in the translation, the initial and final program counter labels are the same. This establishes that the program translation preserves the flow-insensitive program counter label of λ d FG (by means of primitive toLabeled(·)).
Theorem 3 (Semantics Preservation of ⟨⟨ · ⟩⟩
pc ⟨Σ ′ , v⟩, then ⟨⟨⟨Σ⟩⟩, pc, ⟨⟨e⟩⟩⟩ ⇓ ⟨⟨θ ⟩⟩ ⟨⟨⟨Σ ′ ⟩⟩, pc, ⟨⟨v⟩⟩⟩. Proof. By induction on the given evaluation derivation using basic properties of the security lattice and of the translation function.
Recovery of non-interference. We conclude this section by constructing a proof of terminationinsensitive non-interference for λ d FG (Theorem 1) from the corresponding theorem for λ dCG (Theorem 2), using the semantics preserving translation (Theorem 3), together with a property that the translation preserves L-equivalence as well (Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3). Doing so ensures that the meaning of labels is preserved by the translation [Barthe et al. 2007; Rajani and Garg 2018] . In the absence of such an artifact, one could devise a semantics-preserving translation that simply does not use the security features of the target language. While technically correct (i.e., semantics preserving), the translation would not be meaningful from the perspective of security. 17 The following lemma shows that the translation of λ d FG initial configurations, defined as ⟨⟨c⟩⟩ pc = ⟨⟨⟨Σ⟩⟩, pc, ⟨⟨e⟩⟩⟩ if c = ⟨Σ, e⟩, preserves L-equivalence by lifting L-equivalence from source to target and back. Proof. By definition of L-equivalence for initial configurations in both directions (Sections 2.2 and 3.2), using injectivity of the translation function, i.e., if ⟨⟨e 1 ⟩⟩ ≡ α ⟨⟨e 2 ⟩⟩ then e 1 ≡ α e 2 , in the if direction, and by mutually proving similar lemmas for all categories: for stores, i.e.,
The following lemma recovers L-equivalence of source final configurations by back-translating L-equivalence of target final configurations. We define the translation for λ d FG final configurations as ⟨⟨c⟩⟩ pc = ⟨⟨⟨Σ⟩⟩, pc, ⟨⟨v⟩⟩⟩ if c = ⟨Σ, v⟩.
Proof. By case analysis on the L-equivalence relation of the target final configurations, two cases follow. First, we recover L-equivalence of the source stores, i.e., Σ 1 ≈ L Σ 2 , from that of the target stores, i.e., ⟨⟨Σ 1 ⟩⟩ ≈ L ⟨⟨Σ 2 ⟩⟩ from ⟨⟨c 1 ⟩⟩ ≈ L ⟨⟨c 2 ⟩⟩ in both cases. Then, the program counter in the target configurations is either (i) above the attacker's level [Pc H ], i.e., pc ̸ ⊑ L, and the source values are
We start by applying the fine to coarse grained program translation to the initial configurations and environments. By Theorem 3 (semantics preservation), we derive the corresponding λ dCG reductions, i.e., ⟨⟨c 1 ⟩⟩ pc ⇓ ⟨⟨θ 1 ⟩⟩ ⟨⟨c ′ 1 ⟩⟩ pc and ⟨⟨c 2 ⟩⟩ pc ⇓ ⟨⟨θ 2 ⟩⟩ ⟨⟨c ′ 2 ⟩⟩ pc . Then, we lift L-equivalence of the initial configurations and environments from source to target, i.e., from c 1 ≈ L c 2 to ⟨⟨c 1 ⟩⟩ pc ≈ L ⟨⟨c 2 ⟩⟩ pc and from θ 1 ≈ L θ 2 to ⟨⟨θ 1 ⟩⟩ ≈ L ⟨⟨θ 2 ⟩⟩ (Lemma 4.2), and apply λ dCG -TINI (Theorem 2) to obtain L-equivalence of the target final configurations, i.e.,
Finally, we recover Lequivalence of the final configurations from target to source, i.e., from 
COARSE-TO FINE-GRAINED PROGRAM TRANSLATION
We now show a verified program translation in the opposite directionÐfrom the coarse grained calculus λ dCG to the fine grained calculus λ d FG . The translation in this direction is more involvedÐa program in λ d FG contains strictly more information than its counterpart in λ dCG , namely the extra intrinsic label annotations that tag every value. The challenge in constructing this translation is two-fold. On one hand, the translation must come up with labels for all values. However, it is not always possible to do this statically during the translation: Often, the labels depend on input values and arise at run-time with intermediate results since the λ d FG calculus is designed to compute and attach labels at run-time. On the other hand, the translation cannot conservatively enforcement of IFC is static, then there is no label introspection, and this proof artifact is extremely important, as argued in prior work [Barthe et al. 2007; Rajani and Garg 2018] . under-approximate the values of labels 18 Ðλ dCG and λ d FG have label introspection so, in order to get semantics preservation, labels must be preserved precisely. Intuitively, we solve this impasse by crafting a program translation that (i) preserves the labels that can be inspected by λ dCG and (ii) lets the λ d FG semantics compute the remaining label annotations automaticallyÐwe account for those labels with a cross-language relation that represents semantic equivalence between λ d FG and λ dCG modulo extra annotations (Section 5.1). The fact that the source program in λ dCG cannot inspect those labelsÐthey have no value counterpart in the source λ dCG programÐfacilitates this aspect of the translation. We elaborate more on the technical details later. At a high level, an interesting aspect of the translation (that informally attests that it is indeed semantics-preserving) is that it encodes the flow-sensitive program counter of the source λ dCG program into the label annotation of the λ d FG value that results from executing the translated program. For example, if a λ dCG monadic expression starts with program counter label pc and results in some value, say true, and final program counter pc ′ , then the translated λ d FG expression, starting with the same program counter label pc, computes the same value (modulo extra label annotations) at the same security level pc ′ , i.e., the value true pc ′ . This encoding requires keeping the value of the program counter label in the source program synchronized with the program counter label in the target program, by loosening the fine-grained precision of λ d FG at run-time in a controlled way.
Types. The λ dCG -to-λ d FG translation follows the same type-driven approach used in the other direction, starting from the function · in Figure 14a , that translates a λ d FG type τ into the corresponding λ dCG type τ . The translation is defined by induction on τ and preserves all the type constructors standard types. Only the cases corresponding to λ dCG -specific types are interesting. In particular, it converts explicitly labeled types, i.e., Labeled τ , to a standard pair type in λ d FG , i.e., (L × τ ), where the first component is the label and the second component the content of type τ . Type LIO τ becomes a suspension in λ d FG , i.e., the function type unit → τ that delays a computation and that can be forced by simply applying it to the unit value ().
Values. The translation of values follows the type translation, as shown in Figure 14b . Notice that the translation is indexed by the program counter label (the translation is written v pc ),
λx.e = λx. e e 1 e 2 = e 1 e 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) = ( e 1 , e 2 ) fst(e) = fst( e ) snd(e) = snd( e ) inl(e) = inl( e ) inr(e) = inr( e ) case (e, x.e 1 , x.e 2 ) = case ( e , x. e 1 , x. e 2 ) t = λ . t return(e) = e bind(e 1 , x.e 2 ) = let x = e 1 () in taint(labelOf(x), e 2 ()) unlabel(e) = let x = e in taint(fst(x), snd(x)) toLabeled(e) = let x = e () in (labelOf(x), x) labelOf(e) = fst( e ) getLabel = getLabel taint(e) = taint( e , ()) (b) Thunks. which converts the λ dCG value v in scope of a computation protected by security level pc to the corresponding fully label-annotated λ d FG value. The translation is pretty straightforward and uses the program counter label to tag each value, following the λ dCG principle that the program counter label protects every value in scope that is not explicitly labeled. The translation converts a λ dCG function closure into a corresponding λ d FG function closure by translating the body of the function to a λ d FG expression (see below) and translating the environment pointwise, i.e., θ pc = λx. θ (x) pc . A thunk value or a thunk closure, which denotes a suspended side-effecful computation, is also converted into a λ d FG function closure. Technically, the translation would need to introduce a fresh variable that would get bound to unit when the suspension gets forced. However, the argument to the suspension does not have any purpose, so we do not bother with giving a name to it and write . t instead. (In our mechanized proofs we employ unnamed De Bruijn indexes and this issue does not arise.) The translation converts an explicitly labeled value Labeled ℓ v, into a labeled pair at security level pc, i.e., (ℓ ℓ , v ℓ ) pc . The pair consists of the label ℓ tagged with itself, and the value translated at a security level equal to the label annotation, i.e., v ℓ . Notice that tagging the label with itself allows us to translate the λ dCG (label introspection) primitive labelOf(·) by simply projecting the first component, thus preserving the label and its security level across the translation.
Expressions and Thunks. The translation of pure expressions (Figure 15a ) is trivial: it is homomorphic in all constructs, mirroring the type translation. The translation of a thunk expression t builds a suspension explicitly with a λ-abstraction (the name of the variable is again irrelevant, thus we omit it as explained above), and carries on by translating the thunk itself according to the definition in Figure 15b . The thunk return(e) becomes e , since return(·) does not have any side-effect. When two monadic computations are combined via bind(e 1 , x.e 2 ), the translation (i) converts the first computation to a suspension and forces it by applying unit ( e 1 ()), (ii) binds the result to x and passes it to the second computation 19 , which is also converted, forced, and, importantly, iii) executed with a program counter label tainted with the security level of the result new(e) = let x = e in new(taint(fst(x), snd(x))) e 1 := e 2 = e 1 := snd( e 2 ) ! e = ! e labelOfRef(e) = labelOfRef( e ) Fig. 16 . Translation from λ dCG to λ d FG (references).
of the first computation (taint(labelOf(x), e 2 ())). Notice that taint(·) is essential to ensure that the second computation executes with the program counter label set to the correct valueÐthe precision of the fine-grained system would otherwise retain the initial lower program counter label according to rule [App] and the value of the program counter labels in the source and target programs would differ in the remaining execution. Similarly, the translation of unlabel(e) first translates the labeled expression e (the translated expression does not need to be forced because it is not of a monadic type), binds its result to x and then projects the content in a context tainted with its label, as in taint(fst(x), snd(x)). This closely follows λ dCG 's [Unlabel] rule. The translation of toLabeled(e) forces the nested computation with e (), binds its result to x and creates the pair (labelOf(x), x), which corresponds to the labeled value obtained in λ dCG via rule [ToLabeled] . Intuitively, the translation guarantees that the value of the final program counter label in the nested computation coincides with the security level of the translated result (bound to x). Therefore, the first component contains the correct label and it is furthermore at the right security level, because labelOf(·) protects the projected label with the label itself in λ d FG . Primitive labelOf(e) simply projects the first component of the pair that encodes the labeled value in λ d FG as explained above. Lastly, getLabel in λ dCG maps directly to getLabel in λ d FG Ðrule [GetLabel] in λ dCG simply returns the program counter label and does not raise its value, so it corresponds exactly to rule [GetLabel] in λ d FG , which returns label pc at security level pc. Similarly, taint(e) translates to taint( e , ()), since rule [Taint] in λ dCG taints the program counter with the label that e evaluates to, say ℓ and returns unit with program counter label equal to pc ⊔ ℓ, which corresponds to the result of the translated program, i.e., () pc ⊔ ℓ .
References. Figure 16 shows the translation of primitives that access the store via references. Since λ dCG 's rule [New] in Figure 8 creates a new reference labeled with the label of the argument (which must be a labeled value), the translation converts new(e) to an expression that first binds e to x and then creates a new reference with the same content as the source, i.e., snd(x), but tainted with the label in x, i.e., fst(x). Notice that the use of taint(·) is essential to ensure that λ d FG 's rule [New] in Figure 4 assigns the correct label to the new reference. Due to its fine-grained precision, λ d FG might have labeled the content with a different label that is less sensitive than the explicit label that coarsely approximates the security level in λ dCG . In contrast, updating a reference does not require any taintingÐboth λ d FG and λ dCG accept values less sensitive than the reference in rule [Write] . Thus, the translation e 1 := e 2 simply updates the translated reference with the content of the labeled value projected from the translated pair, hence e 1 := e 2 is e 1 := snd( e 2 ). The translation of the primitives that read and query the label of a reference is trivial.
Cross-Language Semantic Equivalence up to Extra Annotations
When a λ dCG program is translated to λ d FG via the program translation described above, the λ d FG result contains strictly more information than the original λ dCG result. This happens because the semantics of λ d FG tracks flows of information at fine granularity, in contrast with λ dCG , which instead coarsely approximates the security level of all values in scope of a computation with the program counter label. When translating a λ dCG program, we can capture this condition precisely for input values θ by homogeneously tagging all standard (unlabeled) values with the initial program counter label, i.e., θ pc . However, a λ dCG program handles, creates and mixes unlabeled data that originated at different security levels at run-time, e.g., when a secret is unlabeled and combined with previously public (unlabeled) data. Crucially, when the translated program executes, the fine-grained semantics of λ d FG tracks those flows of information precisely and thus new labels appear (these labels do not correspond to the label of any labeled value in the source value nor to the program counter label). Intuitively, this implies that the λ d FG result will not be homogeneously labeled with the final program counter label of the λ dCG computation, i.e., if a λ dCG program terminates with value v and program counter label pc ′ , the translated λ d FG program does not necessarily result in v pc ′ .
Example. Consider the λ dCG program ⟨Σ, L, taint(H ); return(x)⟩ ⇓ x →true ⟨Σ, H, true⟩, which returns true = inl() and the store Σ unchanged, after tainting the program counter label with H . Let e be the expression obtained by applying the program translation from Figure 15 to the example program:
Interestingly, when we force the program e and execute it starting from program counter label equal to L, and an input environment translated according to the initial program counter label (L in this case), i.e., x → true
= true L , we do not obtain the translated result homogeneously labeled with H :
In particular, λ d FG preserves the public label tag on data nested inside the left injection, i.e., () [Thunk]) relates function (resp. thunk) closures only when environments are related pointwise, i.e., θ 1 ≈ pc θ 2 iff Dom(θ 1 ) ≡ Dom(θ 2 ) and ∀x.θ 1 (x) ≈ pc θ 2 (x), and the λ d FG function body x. e (resp. thunk body . t ) is obtained from the λ dCG function body e (resp. thunk t) via the program translation defined above. Lastly, rule [Labeled] relates a λ dCG labeled value Labeled ℓ v 1 to a pair (ℓ ℓ , v 2 ), consisting of the label ℓ protected by itself in the first component and value v 2 related with the content v 1 at security level ℓ (v 1 ≈ ℓ v 2 ) in the second component. This rule follows the principle of LIO that for explicitly labeled values, the label annotation represents an upper bound on the sensitivity of the content. Stores are related pointwise, i.e., Σ 1 ≈ Σ 2 iff Σ 1 (ℓ) ≈ Σ 2 (ℓ) for ℓ ∈ L , and ℓ-labeled memories relate their contents respectively at security level ℓ, i.e., [ ] ≈ [ ] and (r 1 : M 1 ) ≈ (r 2 : M 2 ) iff r 1 ≈ ℓ r 2 and M 1 ≈ M 2 for λ d FG and λ dCG memories M 1 , M 2 : Memory ℓ. Lastly, we lift the relation to initial and final configurations.
Definition 1 (Eqivalence of Configurations). For all initial and final configurations:
• ⟨Σ 1 , e ()⟩ ≈ ⟨Σ 2 , pc, e⟩ iff Σ 1 ≈ Σ 2 , • ⟨Σ 1 , t ⟩ ≈ ⟨Σ 2 , pc, t⟩ iff Σ 1 ≈ Σ 2 , • ⟨Σ 1 , r pc ⟩ ≈ ⟨Σ 2 , pc, v⟩ iff Σ 1 ≈ Σ 2 and r ≈ pc v.
For initial configurations, the relation requires the λ d FG code to be obtained from the λ dCG expression (resp. thunk) via the program translation function · defined above (similar to rules [Fun] and [Thunk] in Figure 17 ). Furthermore, in the first case (expressions), the relation additionally forces the translated suspension e by applying it to (), so that when the λ d FG security monitor executes the translated program, it obtains the result that corresponds to the λ dCG monadic program e. The third definition relates final configurations whenever the stores are related and the security level of the final λ d FG result corresponds to the program counter label pc of the final λ dCG configuration, and the final λ dCG result corresponds to the λ d FG result up to extra annotations at security level pc, i.e., r ≈ pc v.
Before showing semantics preservation, we prove some basic properties of the equivalence that will be useful later. The following property allows instantiating the semantics preservation theorem with the λ dCG initial configuration. The translation for initial configurations is per-component, i.e., ⟨Σ, pc, t⟩ = ⟨ Σ , t ⟩ and forcing for suspensions, i.e., ⟨Σ, pc, e⟩ = ⟨ Σ , e ()⟩, pointwise for stores, i.e., Σ = λℓ. Σ(ℓ) , and memories, i. Proof. The proof is by induction and relies on analogous properties for all syntactic categories: for stores, Σ ≈ Σ, for memories, M ≈ M, for environments θ pc ≈ pc θ , for values v pc ≈ pc v, for any label pc.
The next property guarantees that values and environments remain in the relation when the program counter label rises.
Property 4 (Weakening). For all labels pc and pc ′ such that pc ⊑ pc ′ , and for all λ d FG raw values r 1 , values v 1 and environments θ 1 , and λ dCG values v 2 and environments θ 2 :
Proof. By mutual induction on the cross-language equivalence relation.
Correctness
With the help of the cross-language relation defined above, we can now state and prove that the λ dCG -to-λ d FG translation is correct, i.e., it satisfies a semantics-preservation theorem analogous to that proved for the translation in the opposite direction. At a high level, the theorem ensures that the translation preserves the meaning of a secure terminating λ dCG program when executed under λ d FG semantics, with the same program counter label and translated input values. Since the translated λ d FG program computes strictly more information than the original λ dCG program, the theorem existentially quantify over the λ d FG result, but insists that it is semantically equivalent to the original λ dCG result at a security level equal to the final value of the program counter label, using the cross-language relation just defined.
We start by proving that the program translation preserves typing.
Lemma 5.1 (Type Preservation). If Γ ⊢ e : τ then Γ ⊢ e : τ .
Proof. By straightforward induction on the typing judgment. Next, we prove semantics preservation of λ dCG pure reductions. Since these reductions do not perform any security-relevant operation (they do not read or write state), they can be executed with any program counter label in λ d FG and do not change the state in λ d FG .
Lemma 5.2 ( · : λ dCG → λ d FG preserves Pure Semantics). If e ⇓ θ v then for any program counter label pc, λ d FG store Σ, environment θ ′ such that θ ′ ≈ pc θ , there exists a raw value r , such that ⟨Σ, e ⟩ ⇓ θ ′ pc ⟨Σ, r pc ⟩ and r ≈ pc v.
Proof. By induction on the given evaluation derivation and using basic properties of the lattice. Notice that the lemma holds for any input target environment θ ′ in relation with the source environment θ at security level pc rather than just for the translated environment θ pc . Intuitively, we needed to generalize the lemma so that the induction principle is strong enough to discharge cases where (i) we need to prove reductions that use an existentially quantified environment, e.g., [App] and (ii) when some intermediate result at a security level other than pc gets added to the environment, so the environment is no longer homogenously labeled with pc. While the second condition does not arise in pure reductions, it does occur in the reduction of monadic expressions considered in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 ( · : λ dCG → λ d FG preserves Thunk and Forcing Semantics). approach, which is easier to implement and use, without giving up on the precision of fine-grained IFC.
